About My Background
On William Dembski’s blog, Uncommon Descent, Thomas Cudworth, in an otherwise carefully crafted reply, writes of me: “Originally a Protestant and a supporter of intelligent design as formulated by the major ID theorists, he has since become a Roman Catholic and a Thomist, and now believes that the best arguments for design are metaphysical arguments of a Thomist variety, rather than scientific arguments of the sort proposed by ID supporters.”
First, I was originally Catholic (baptized and confirmed by the age of 12) became Protestant and then returned to the Catholic Church (in 2007).
Second, I have been a Thomist since the mid-1980s, which I explain more fully in my 2009 book, Return to Rome: Confessions of An Evangelical Catholic (Brazos Press).
Third, I have never been a supporter of ID, though I have argued (and still argue) that there is nothing unconstitutional with teaching it in public schools. I take this position largely because I think that establishment clause jurisprudence unjustly sequesters ideas from the public square simply because those ideas are informed by theological traditions, even though those ideas may be legitimately defended on the basis of “public reason.” My recent article in The Journal of Law and Religion, “Must Theology Sit in the Back of the Secular Bus?” makes that very point.
About Thomas Aquinas
Fourth, Thomas Aquinas did not have an argument from design, as one finds in William Paley’s work.1 What Thomas had was an argument from final causes in nature to the existence of a Being that such causes require in order to account for their contingent existence. But those causes are not detachable from nature, as is the “design” found in Paley’s watchmaker argument. For Paley, living organisms may or may not be designed, and we are only permitted to infer design when an organism’s parts seem improbably arranged to achieve a particular end.
Not so for Thomas. For the Angelic Doctor, final causes are intrinsic to nature. To use an example: the purpose of the lungs is to exchange oxygen for the good of the whole organism. One could, of course, provide an exhaustive account of respiration relying only on efficient and material causes. But that account would not mean that one is not justified in saying that the lungs have a final cause. For Thomas, final causality is not a rival to efficient and material causes. Rather, it works in concert with them.
On the other hand, for Paley, “design” in living organisms is a rival to efficient and material causes. This is why he must point to the superb complexity of the watch to achieve its end (telling time) in order to provide justification for his claim that the watch is in fact designed and that it is analogous to what we observe in nature. But suppose someone offered a theory that may also account for this design relying only on efficient and material causes? (In fact, an evolutionary account would be such a theory.)2 In that case, there is a potential defeater to Paley’s theory. But that means for Paley that material and efficient causes are a rival and not a complement to final causality.
For this reason, I do not think that Cudworth quite captures my concerns when he contrasts my embracing of Thomistic “design” with my apparent lack of interest in “scientific” arguments by ID supporters. My concern is that the ID supporters (more specifically, those who rely on notions of irreducible or specified complexity in nature to detect design) in fact offer a case that is inconsistent with Thomistic metaphysics.3 I say this because ID supporters offer their understanding of “design” as a defeater to naturalism.4 But naturalism is a philosophical (indeed, a metaphysical) and not a scientific point of view. Moreover, to say that ID will accomplish this task by employing the methods of empirical science5 —which concerns itself exclusively with efficient and material causes—means that its proponents think of nature as Paley did, mechanistic. This is why, for example, ID advocates analogize their project with the detection of the agent causes of artifacts in anthropology, computer science, and the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). In each of these cases, the thing created is a result of a mind taking the material parts of other things and designing them for some end extrinsically imposed on the parts. Whether it is pottery, computer programs, or alien messages, each is the consequence of imposing form and finality on that which does not have them by nature.
Conclusion
ID advocates offer their case as a scientific defeater to naturalism. But naturalism is not a scientific theory. It is a metaphysical one. So, when Cudworth and other critics suggest that I am committing a category mistake by contrasting “ID science” with “Thomistic metaphysics” while they argue that “ID science” can defeat naturalism (a metaphysical theory), they snatch confusion from the jaws of clarity.
In my next essay I will say more about Thomism and ID by addressing the charge that some of us do not take into consideration the central question of whether or not ID arguments are reasonable.